We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time-and compatibility-based preferences. We derive the dynamically efficient two-way and multi-way exchange mechanisms that maximize total discounted exchange surplus. Recently several live-donor kidney exchange programmes were established to swap incompatible donors of end-stage kidney disease patients. Since kidney exchange can be modelled as a special instance of our more general model, dynamically efficient kidney exchange mechanisms are derived as corollaries. We make policy recommendations using simulations.
INTRODUCTION
There are about 79,000 patients waiting for a kidney transplant in the UnitedStates as of March 2009. In 2008, about only 16,500 transplants were conducted, about 10,500 from deceased donors and 6000 from living donors, while about 32,500 new patients joined the deceased donor waiting list and 4200 patients died while waiting for a kidney.
1 Although there is a substantial organ shortage, buying and selling an organ is illegal in many countries in the world, making donation the only source for kidney transplants. Especially in the last decade, the increase in the number of kidney transplants came from the utilization of live donors, who are typically relatives, friends, or spouses of the patients and are willing to donate one of their kidneys. However, many living donors still cannot be utilized, since the potential donor may not be able to donate to her loved one due to blood-type incompatibility or tissue rejection. The medical community has proposed innovative ways to utilize these living donors through live-donor kidney exchanges (Rapaport, 1986) . In a live-donor kidney exchange, recipients with incompatible donors swap their donors if there is crosscompatibility. Since 1991, kidney exchanges have been done mostly in an ad-hoc manner in different countries around the world. Live-donor kidney exchanges accounted for at least 10% of all live donor transplants in Korea and the Netherlands in 2004 (see Park et al., 2004; de Klerk et al., 2005) . The medical community has endorsed the practice of live-donor kidney exchanges as ethical (Abecassis et al., 2000) . Unlike Korea and the Netherlands, in the United States there is no national system to oversee kidney exchanges as of 2009. Different transplant centres around the country have recently started kidney exchange programmes. For example, New England Program for Kidney Exchange (NEPKE) is an initiative of the transplant centres in New England together with economists (see Roth, Sönmez andÜnver, 2005b) , and Alliance for Paired Donation (APD) is an initiative of Dr Michael Rees at University of Toledo and the authors of the above studies. APD has already convinced a large number when agents arrive over time under Poisson processes in different environments under different objectives. 5 We consider a general dynamic problem from the point of view of a central authority (e.g. a health authority). Each agent (e.g. a recipient) arrives with an object to trade (e.g. a donor). Waiting in the pool for an exchange is costly. The agent has a need type and objects have object types. The desirability of an object is determined by its type and the need type of the agent. This compatibility relation is a partial order. That is, each agent finds an object with a type that is better than or the same as her own type (other than her own attached object) desirable. Thus, each pair is represented by a pair type determined by the need type of the agent and type of her paired object. Each pair type arrives with a stochastic Poisson arrival process.
The central authority's objective is to minimize the long-run total discounted waiting cost. We make an assumption in the derivation of the efficient two-way matching mechanism. We assume that in the long run, there is an arbitrarily large number of underdemanded types of pairs, whose object types are not compatible with the needs of recipients' need types. (Later, we show that this assumption is consistent with real-life arrival probabilities of different pairs for the case of kidney exchanges.) We show that an interesting characteristic of an efficient two-way matching mechanism is that it conducts the maximum number of exchanges as soon as they become available; that is, there is no need to sacrifice one or more currently feasible exchanges for the sake of conducting future exchanges (Theorem 1). However, this theorem no longer holds when larger exchanges are feasible, and we derive the efficient multi-way matching mechanism as a threshold matching mechanism under one additional assumption (Theorems 2 and 3, also see Remark 1 in Appendix B). In the simplified version of the model, when there are no self-demanded types participating exchange, i.e. types of pairs with the same agent need and object type, a threshold mechanism relies on a single threshold vector. Suppose W 1 and W 2 are two object types that are not comparable under the compatibility partial order; that is, neither W 1 is better than W 2 , nor W 2 is better than W 1 . Then, the efficient mechanism considers the number of W 1 -W 2 type pairs (W 1 type agents and W 2 type paired-objects) and reciprocal W 2 -W 1 type pairs together. Depending on the frequencies of arrival of different pairs, one of the two types of threshold mechanisms is efficient. In the first possible solution, the efficient mechanism conducts the maximum size exchanges as soon as they become available as long as there are no W 2 -W 1 type pairs. However, if there are some W 2 -W 1 type pairs already available in the exchange pool, and their number does not exceed a threshold number, then the authority should not use the W 2 -W 1 type pairs other than matching W 1 -W 2 type pairs. In this case, it should avoid involving them in larger exchanges that do not have W 1 -W 2 type pairs. Only when the stock of W 2 -W 1 type pairs exceeds the threshold number should the authority conduct the largest possible exchanges as soon as they become available, and possibly use W 2 -W 1 type pairs in exchanges without W 1 -W 2 type of pairs. The second possible solution is just the symmetric version of the first solution, and instead treats W 1 -W 2 type pairs as the stock variable. The mechanism takes into account all such non-comparable W 1 and W 2 types. We show that decisions regarding each incomparable object type W 1 and W 2 are independent from those regarding other incomparable object types (Propositions 2 and 6). Abdulkadiroglu and Loertscher (2006) inspects the dynamic preference formation in house allocation problems. In other domains, there are several recent studies on optimal mechanisms in dynamic settings. For example, Jackson and Palfrey (1998) study optimal bargaining mechanisms in a dynamic setting, and Skreta (2006) studies optimal dynamic mechanism design when the designer cannot commit to a mechanism in the future. Another topic that is attracting recent attention is optimal auction design when valuation signals of agents evolve over time (e.g. Bergemann and Välimaki, 2006; Athey and Segal, 2007) .
A recent paper by
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Our constraints in the general model are consistent with the medical and institutional constraints of the kidney exchange problem.
First, in the medical literature, Gjertson and Cecka (2000) and Delmonico (2004) pointed out that a recipient is indifferent between two live-donor kidneys as long as they are both compatible with the recipient. We adopt this assumption in our current study and assume that the preferences of the recipients fall into three indifference classes: being matched to a compatible kidney, being unmatched, and being matched to an incompatible kidney. 6 We also introduce time preferences of recipients into the dynamic setting. This is consistent with our general model's assumptions.
Second, the practice of kidney exchange has started by conducting exchanges that include only two recipients and their incompatible donors. More complicated exchanges that include three or more recipients (and their donors) will take place less frequently, because all transplants of a single exchange cycle should take place simultaneously. Otherwise, some donors could potentially back out after their recipients receive transplants given the legal constraint that it is illegal to force a donor to sign a contract that would commit him to donation. Nevertheless, Roth, Sönmez andÜnver (2007) have shown that larger exchanges, especially three-way exchanges including three recipient-donor pairs, would substantially increase the gains from exchange. In the current paper, we separately derive efficient dynamic matching mechanisms that conduct two-way exchanges and multi-way exchanges, which is consistent with our general derivation.
Since blood-type compatibility needed for kidney donations is a special case of the above compatibility partial order, the efficient kidney exchange mechanism is a special instance of the general mechanism under certain assumptions. We compute the efficient mechanism under different pair arrival rates and time discount rates. Additionally, we conduct policy simulations and observe that the gains under the efficient multi-way kidney exchange mechanism are significantly higher than those under the efficient two-way mechanism.
THE GENERAL DYNAMIC EXCHANGE MODEL
Exchange pool
We consider an exchange model in which each agent arrives at the exchange pool with an (indivisible) object to trade through barter exchange. A pair i consists of an agent a i and her object o i . There is a requirement type for each agent over the objects and each object belongs to one of these types. Let T be the finite set of requirement/object types. Since each agent's requirement and each object belongs to one of these types, there are |T| 2 permutations for each pair. We call each of these permutations a pair type. The type of a pair is denoted as X-Y where X, Y ∈ T and X is the requirement type of the agent and Y is the type of her object. Let P = T × T be the set of pair types. For any pair type X-Y ∈ P, let p X-Y be the probability of a random pair being of type X-Y. We refer to p X-Y as the arrival probability of pair type X-Y ∈ P. We have
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Example (b) Though is not a complete relation (i.e. not a linear order), for simplicity, we assume that for any type X ∈ T, there exists at most one type in Y ∈ T that is not comparable with X. That is, for any X ∈ T, there exists at most one Y ∈ T such that neither X Y nor Y X is true.
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Based on the compatibility relation, we can partially order types in levels. Let the level set L = {1, 2, . . . , |L|} be the partition of T such that for all K, L ∈ {1, 2, . . . |L| − 1} with K < L, if X ∈ K and Y ∈ L , then X Y. In this case, we say that X is at a better compatibility level than Y. Observe that for any L ∈ L, X, Y ∈ L with X = Y imply X Y and Y X. For each compatibility type X ∈ T, let L X ∈ L be the compatibility level of X, i.e. X ∈ L X . Though both notations, levels, and binary relation , can be used interchangably, we will stick to the latter in most parts of the paper. We will use levels to quantify the magnitude of difference between levels of different types. See Figure 1 for two examples of feasible type sets and compatibility partial orders.
An agent cannot consume her own object. Each agent would like to consume another pair's object that is compatible with her. We assume that pairs arrive over time with a stochastic (discrete) Poisson arrival process in continuous time. Let λ be the arrival rate of the pairs, i.e. the expected number of pairs that arrive per unit time. Thus, each type X-Y arrives with a Poisson arrival process with rate p X-Y λ. The exchange pool is the set of the pairs that arrived over time whose agent has not yet been assigned an object.
Each agent has preferences over objects and over time of waiting in the pool. Compatible objects are preferred to being unmatched. In turn, being unmatched is preferred to being Ü NVER DYNAMIC KIDNEY EXCHANGE 377 matched to incompatible objects. 8 Moreover, time spent in the exchange pool is another dimension in the preferences of agents: waiting is costly. We will model the waiting cost through a fixed cost.
Exchange
An exchange is a list of pairs (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k ) for some k ≥ 2 such that for any < k, object o i is assigned to agent a i +1 , and object o i k is assigned to agent a i 1 . We will sometimes refer to an exchange by the types of the participating pairs, i.e. as (A 1 -O 1 , . . . , A k -O k ) where A -O is the pair type of i . A matching is a set of exchanges such that each pair participates in at most one exchange. A matching or an exchange is individually rational if it never matches an agent with an incompatible object. From now on, when we talk about an exchange or a matching, it will be individually rational. A matching is maximal if it matches the maximum number of pairs possible at an instance of the pool.
A (dynamic) matching mechanism is a dynamic procedure such that at each time t ≥ 0 it selects a (possibly empty) matching of the pairs available in the pool. Once a pair is matched at time t by a matching mechanism, it leaves the pool and its agent receives the assigned object.
Let A(t) represent the set of pairs that arrived at the pool until time t. If a matching mechanism φ is executed (starting time 0), φ (t, A) is the set of pairs matched by mechanism φ under the flow A. There are |A(t)| − |φ (t, A)| pairs available at the pool at time t.
Dynamically efficient mechanisms
There is a central authority that oversees the exchanges. For each pair, we associate waiting in the pool with a monetary cost and we assume that there is a constant unit time cost c > 0 of waiting for an exchange.
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Suppose that the central authority implements a matching mechanism φ. For any time t, the current value of expected cost at time t under matching mechanism φ is given as
where ρ is the discount rate. For any time τ , t such that τ > t, we have
where the first term is the expected number of pairs to arrive at the exchange pool in the interval [t, τ ] and the second term is the number of pairs that arrived at the pool until time t. Therefore, we can rewrite E t C φ (t, A) as
8. In the context of kidney transplantation, Gjertson and Cecka (2000) point out that each compatible live-donor kidney will last approximately the same amount of time as long as the donor is not too old and in relatively in good health.
9. In the context of kidney exchanges, the alternative option of a transplant is dialysis. A patient can undergo dialysis continuously. It is well known that receiving a transplant causes the patient to resume a better life (cf. Overbeck et al., 2005) . Also healthcare costs for dialysis are more than those for transplantation in the long term (cf. Schweitzer et al., 1998) . We model all the costs associated with undergoing continuous dialysis by the unit time cost c.
10. E t refers to the expected value at time t.
Only the last term in equation (2) depends on the choice of mechanism φ. The previous terms cannot be controlled by the central authority, since they are the costs associated with the number of pairs arriving at the pool. We refer to this last term as the exchange surplus at time t for mechanism φ and denote it by
We can rewrite it as
The first term above is the exchange surplus attributable to all exchanges that have been done until time t and at time t, and the second term is the future exchange surplus attributable to the exchanges to be done in the future. The central authority cannot control the number of past exchanges at time t either. Let n φ (τ , A) be the number of matched recipients at time τ by mechanism φ, and we have
We focus on the present and future exchange surplus, which is given as
A dynamic matching mechanism φ is efficient if for any t, it maximizes the present and future exchange surplus at time t given in equation (6). We look for solutions of the problem independent of initial conditions and time t. 
DYNAMICALLY EFFICIENT TWO-WAY MATCHING MECHANISMS
In this section, we derive the dynamically efficient two-way matching mechanism. A two-way exchange is an exchange involving only two pairs. A matching is a two-way matching if all exchanges in the matching are two-way exchanges. It will be useful to introduce the following concepts about two-way exchanges. We say that two pairs i and j are mutually compatible if object o i is compatible with agent a j and object o j is compatible with agent a i .
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The following observation states the important individual rationality constraints that need to be respected in our derivation of an efficient matching mechanism: We refer to the set
as the set of underdemanded pair types X-Y, which can participate in two-way exchanges with pair types W-Z with Y W and Z X. Since W Z and W = Z, by transitivity Y X and X = Y. Hence, underdemanded types can only be matched with certain overdemanded pair types. We refer to the set
as the set of self-demanded pair types. Self-demanded types X-X can only be matched with X-X type pairs or types W-Z with Z X W and Z = W, which are certain overdemanded pairs. We refer to the set
as the set of reciprocally demanded types. They can only be matched with their reciprocal types Y-X and certain pairs W-Z with Z X, Y W and Z = W, which are certain overdemanded pairs.
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Throughout this section we will maintain one assumption:
Assumption 1 (Long-run assumption). Under any dynamic matching mechanism, in the long run, there is an arbitrarily large number of underdemanded pairs from each pair type in the exchange pool. 14 Since we are interested in maximizing the exchange surplus and cannot control the inflow of the pairs, this assumption will not harm our objective, even though under cost minimization this assumption leads to ∞ cost for any matching mechanism.
We state the following Lemma directly using the construction of sets P O , P U , P S , P R and their properties stated above (we skip its proof for brevity): Lemma 1. In a static population of pairs under Assumption 1, where n X-Y denotes the number of pairs of any type X-Y ∈ P, the maximum number of pairs matched through two-way exchanges is given by 15
We are ready to state our main result of this section: • mechanism ν is a dynamically efficient two-way matching mechanism; and • any dynamically efficient two-way matching mechanism conducts a two-way exchange whenever one becomes feasible.
Let dynamic two-way matching mechanism ν be defined as in the hypothesis of Theorem 1, that is, for any arriving pair of any type X-Y ∈ P, mechanism ν matches this pair immediately with an existing Y-X type pair if such a mutually compatible pair exists in the pool, and does not perform any exchanges, otherwise.
We will prove Theorem 1 using the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, within any time interval τ , mechanism ν matches the maximum number of pairs possible under any two-way matching mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Suppose that mechanism ν is used for the exchange. Consider a time interval τ > 0 in the long run. Let t 0 be the start of this time interval and t 1 = t 0 + τ be the end of this time interval. Since each type is matched with its reciprocal type under mechanism ν, in the long run we have, (1) for any type Z 1 -Z 2 ∈ P U , by Assumption 1, there will be an arbitrarily large number of type Z 1 -Z 2 pairs available; (2) for any type X-Y ∈ P O , since there is an arbitrarily large number of type Y-X pairs available (by Statement 1 above), for any incoming X-Y type pair i there will exist at least one Y-X type pair that is mutually compatible, and mechanism ν will immediately match these two pairs, implying that no type X-Y pairs will remain available; (3) for any type V-V ∈ P S , whenever x type V-V pairs are available in the exchange pool, mechanism ν will match 2 x 2 of these pairs with each other, implying that there will be 0 or 1 type V-V pair available; (4) for any W 1 -W 2 ∈ P R , there is either no W 
where n X-Y is the number of type X-Y pairs that are available at time t 1 , if no exchange has been conducted in interval [t 0 , t 1 ). Moreover, for any X-Y ∈ P, this number in equation (11) for the self-demanded types by Statement 3, and
for the reciprocally demanded types by Statement 4, and their sum is exactly equal to the expression given in equation (11), completing the proof of Proposition 1.
Theorem 1 can be proven using Proposition 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Fix time τ in the long run. For any mechanism φ and any time t > τ, |φ (t, A)| − |φ (τ , A)| is the total number of recipients matched between time τ and t under mechanism φ when the flow function is given by A, and is maximized by the mechanism ν by Proposition 1. Since
is maximized by φ = ν, as well. Moreover, mechanism ν conducts the maximum possible number of exchanges at any given point in time as 0 or 2 (permitted by the two-way exchange restriction). Therefore, n φ (τ , A) is also maximized by φ = ν. These imply
dt is maximized for φ = ν, implying that ν is an efficient two-way matching mechanism. Moreover, it conducts the maximum number of transplants at each time, completing the proof of Theorem 1.
Note that since we can roughly define an efficient mechanism ν independent of the state of the pool, we did not introduce an explicit state space for the pool. It turns out that under multi-way exchanges, an efficient mechanism explicitly depends on the state.
DYNAMICALLY EFFICIENT MULTI-WAY MATCHING MECHANISMS
In this section, we consider matching mechanisms that allow not only two-way exchanges, but larger exchanges as well. We maintain Assumption 1 throughout this section. Hence, there are arbitrarily many underdemanded pairs in the exchange pool in the long run.
We state Proposition 2 as follows:
Proposition 2 (Necessary and sufficient conditions for matching underdemanded, self-demanded, and reciprocally demanded types in multi-way exchanges). The proof of the above proposition is in Appendix A. We also state and prove Proposition 6, which is in regard to the sizes of maximal exchanges in Appendix A. These two propositions bring several simplifications to the optimization problem.
Suppose that X-Y∈ P O is the pair type of an arriving overdemanded pair, i.e. Y X and yet Y = X. Instead of matching this pair and serving one underdemanded pair (as in two-way exchanges, for example, by matching it with a pair of type Y-X), we can potentially use this pair in larger exchanges to serve more underdemanded pairs, if multi-way exchanges are allowed.
It could also be the case that there are multiple reciprocally demanded pairs of different compatibility levels existent in the exchange pool when the X-Y type overdemanded pair arrives. Without loss of generality, we can assume that no two of these types are at the same compatibility level. If they were, we could have matched the pairs of these types with each other in two-way exchanges until one of them has no more pairs left. It could also be the case that there are multiple self-demanded pairs at different compatibility levels in the exchange pool. Without loss of generality, we can assume that no two of these pairs have the same pair type (since otherwise, if there are k > 1 pairs of type V-V, we could serve them in a k-way exchange as V-V,V-V, . . . ,V-V).
We will refer to the pairs satisfying the conditions in Proposition 2 to be matched using an overdemanded pair as matchable pairs. We state the following corollary to Proposition 6 about matchable pairs:
• decisions regarding matchable self-demanded and reciprocally demanded pairs with object and agent types located at different compatibility levels of the partial order are independent from each other.
That is, under an efficient mechanism, not only can we match the maximum number of possible underdemanded pairs, but we can always enlarge an exchange by squeezing in a matchable reciprocally demanded or self-demanded pair belonging to a different compatibility level than the ones in the exchange, at the cost of replacing only underdemanded pairs in the exchange with different ones. Suppose an exchange E has been fixed with a single overdemanded pair. Then we can squeeze in a reciprocally demanded pair (if the conditions in Proposition 2 are satisfied) without affecting the rest of the overdemanded, reciprocally demanded, and self-demanded pairs in E, and match the same number of underdemanded pairs as E does. We can almost do the same thing using a self-demanded pair except if there is already another self-demanded pair of a compatibility type that is incomparable to this pair. In the latter case, a new reciprocally demanded pair belonging to this compatibility level is also needed (see Footnote 32) . The new exchange may replace at most two underdemanded pairs of E with new ones. Since by Assumption 1 underdemanded pairs are abundant, this minimal change will have no effect on optimization. An example of such insertions is given below using the type sets in Figure 1 (a).
An example regarding overdemanded type pairs helping out other pairs in multi-way exchanges: Consider the types in Figure 1 (a). Suppose that an E-A 1 type overdemanded pair arrives under Assumption 1. E-A 1 can be used to match all underdemanded, self-demanded, and reciprocally demanded pairs. Figure 2 shows a number of exchanges that can be conducted through the E-A 1 type pair. Exchange (a) is conducted to match the maximum number of underdemanded pairs, which is L A 1 − L E = 4. In Exchange (b), we squeeze in an A 1 -A 2 type reciprocally demanded pair by replacing pair 3 in Exchange (a) with pair 7. In Exchange (c), we additionally squeeze in a D 2 -D 2 type self-demanded pair by replacing pairs 4 and 5 in Exchange (b) with pairs 8 and 10, respectively. In Exchange (d), we squeeze in a D 1 -D 1 type self-demanded pair. However, there is already another pair at the same compatibility level, namely pair 9 of type D 2 -D 2 . Thus, we need an additional D 1 -D 2 or D 2 -D 1 type reciprocally demanded pair to accommodate this new pair together with pair 9. In the figure, we use pair 12 of type D 1 -D 2 as a "bridge pair" between D 1 -D 1 and D 2 -D 2 type pairs. In this case, we also replace underdemanded pair 8 with pair 4.
All the above results assume that there exists at most one overdemanded pair in the pool. However, if we do not match an overdemanded pair immediately, there can be more than one. We state one other assumption, which will ensure that an overdemanded pair will never be kept in the pool.
Suppose that W 1 -W 2 and W 2 -W 1 are two reciprocally demanded pair types at the same compatibility level. We show that as long as the difference between W 1 -W 2 and W 2 -W 1 type arrival frequencies is not large, overdemanded type pairs will be matched immediately under the efficient mechanism. The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix A. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, since an overdemanded pair will be matched immediately when it arrives, we will only need to make decisions in situations in which multiple exchanges of different sizes are feasible. Thus, using multi-way exchanges, we can benefit from not conducting the largest feasible exchange currently available and holding onto some of the pairs, which can currently participate in an exchange, in the expectation of saving more pairs sooner.
For example, consider a situation in which an overdemanded X-Y type pair arrives at the pool, while a reciprocally demanded W 1 -W 2 type pair which can be matched using the X-Y type pair is also available.
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By Corollary 1, the decisions regarding the W 1 -W 2 type pair are independent from decisions regarding other reciprocally demanded pair types except type W 2 -W 1 . 16 Since by Assumption 1 there is an excess number of underdemanded type pairs in the long run, by Corollary 1 there are two candidates for an optimal exchange: for some number n
• an n-way kidney exchange without the W 1 -W 2 type pair or • an (n + 1)-way exchange including the W 1 -W 2 type pair.
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Which exchange should the central authority choose? We answer this question by converting the problem to an embedded Markov decision process with a state space consisting of |P| dimensional integer vectors that show the number of pairs in the pool belonging to each pair-type. 18, 19 There is additional structure to eliminate some of these state variables under Assumptions 1 and 2:
• For the overdemanded types: If an overdemanded pair i of type X-Y ∈ P O arrives, by Proposition 3, pair i will be matched immediately in some exchange. Hence, the number of overdemanded pairs remaining in the pool is always 0.
• For the underdemanded types: By Assumption 1, there will be an arbitrarily large number of underdemanded pairs. Hence, the number of underdemanded pairs is always ∞.
• For the self-demanded types: Whenever a self-demanded pair i of type V-V ∈ P S is available in the exchange pool, as an implication of Corollary 1, the decisions may be complicated by the existence of other self-demanded and reciprocally demanded type pairs in the same compatibility level. Selection of other pairs in an exchange may affect which self-demanded type pairs will be used if different type pairs are simultaneously available. A self-demanded type can never save an underdemanded or reciprocally demanded pair without the help of an overdemanded or reciprocally demanded pair(s) by Proposition 2. On the other hand, if there is more than one such type of a pair, then we can match all such pairs together in an exchange. This and the above observations imply that under an efficient matching mechanism, for any V-V ∈ P S , at steady-state there will be either zero or one V-V type pair. Therefore, self-demanded types' effect to the reduced state space will be reflected by four additional state variables, each getting values of either 0 or 1. We first derive the efficient dynamic matching mechanism by ignoring the self-demanded type pairs; then we will reintroduce the self-demanded types to the problem and comment on the dynamically efficient matching mechanism for our leading example of kidney exchanges in Appendix B.
Assumption 3 (No self-demanded types assumption). There are no self-demanded types available for exchange and p
• For the reciprocally demanded types: By the above analyses, there are no overdemanded and self-demanded type pairs available and there are infinitely many underdemanded type -an n-way exchange without a W 1 -W 2 type pair and with one of the two self-demanded pairs, and -an n + 2-way exchange that additionally matches a W 1 -W 2 type pair and the other self-demanded pair.
18. See Puterman (1994) for an excellent survey of continuous-time and discrete-time Markov decision processes. 19. Since the pairs arrive according to a Poisson process, which is memory-less, solving the problem only for this Markov decision process with |P| variables will also provide a solution of the original problem stated in equation (6). Moreover, this solution will be independent of other characteristics such as the inflow and match history of the exchange, time, and initial conditions. pairs. Therefore, the state of the exchange pool can simply be denoted by the number of reciprocally demanded pairs. On the other hand, any reciprocally demanded pairs of types W 1 -W 2 and W 2 -W 1 ∈ P R can be matched in a two-way exchange. Moreover, by Proposition 2, a reciprocally demanded type pair cannot save an underdemanded pair in an exchange without the help of an overdemanded pair. Hence, the most efficient use of W 1 -W 2 and W 2 -W 1 type pairs is to be matched with each other in a two-way exchange. Therefore, under the efficient matching mechanism, a W 1 -W 2 and W 2 -W 1 type pair will never remain in the pool together, but will be matched via a two-way exchange. Let P R * ⊆ P R be fixed such that for all In our running example explored in Figure 1 (a), we can set
Markov chain representation
In this subsection, we characterize the transition from one state to another under a dynamically efficient matching mechanism by a Markov chain when Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold: 
Bellman equations
In this subsection, we derive the Bellman equations that will be used to find the efficient matching mechanism. Let τ 1 be the time between two arrivals. Since the arrival process is a Poisson process with arrival rate λ, where λ is the expected number of arrivals in unit time, then τ 1 is distributed with an exponential distribution with parameter λ, that is, the probability density function of τ 1 is λe −λτ 1 . Then, the expected total discounting that occurs until a new pair arrives is given by
Figure 3 Transitions with arrivals when
When a pair is matched in the exchange pool, the surplus related to the pair is
Using the analyses in the previous subsection, under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, we can state Bellman equations for the reduced continuous time Markov process. By Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, ES (s), the total surplus at state s ∈ S under the efficient rule can be written as the sum of surpluses regarding each type:
where
is the expected total discounting related to all future incoming X-Y type pairs, L X − L Y is the number of underdemanded type pairs, and 1 is the number of the overdemanded pair that can be matched regardless of the reciprocally demanded pairs matched. Since underdemanded types cannot be matched without the help of overdemanded types (by Proposition 2), we incorporate their surplus to the surplus of overdemanded types.
• ES V-V = 0 for all V-V∈ P S by Assumption 3. 20. We will later observe that the optimal matching mechanism is independent of how this individual surplus is calculated. Thus, it is robust to the interpretation of surplus. 
On the right-hand side of equation (16) (1) the first row considers the case when an overdemanded pair that cannot be used in matching a W 1 -W 2 type pair or an underdemanded pair or a reciprocally demanded pair of types other than W 1 -W 2 and W 2 -W 1 arrives; (2) the second row considers the case when an overdemanded pair that can be used in matching a W 1 -W 2 type pair arrives, leading to a decision of either matching the W 1 -W 2 type pair or not together with the efficient size exchanges decided for other types; and (3) 
Note that since by Assumption 3, p V-V = 0 for all V-V∈ P S , we have
Similarly, we can write the Bellman equation for state components s W 1 -W 2 < 0 as follows:
For state component 0, the Bellman equation is
The following observations will be useful for our analysis in the next section. They follow from the formulation of the problem. (17), (18), and (19) .
The efficient matching mechanism
A (deterministic) Markov matching mechanism φ is a matching mechanism that chooses the same action whenever the Markov chain is in the same state. In our reduced state and action problem, a Markov matching mechanism makes multiple decisions at a state depending on the type of an arriving pair and the number and the types of reciprocally demanded pairs in the pool. For each reciprocally demanded type W 1 -W 2 existing in the pool, when an overdemanded type pair that can be used to match a W 1 -W 2 type pair arrives, the two decisions are (a) conduct an exchange without a W 1 -W 2 pair, but with the maximum possible number of underdemanded pairs (action do-not-match), or (b) conduct an exchange with a W 1 -W 2 pair and the maximum possible number of underdemanded pairs (action match). The remaining choices of the Markov mechanism are straightforward: it chooses an exchange with the maximum number of underdemanded pairs when such an exchange becomes feasible as outlined in Figure 3 for positive states, Figure 4 for state zero, and the symmetric version of Figure 3 
maximal size exchanges are conducted whenever they become feasible.
•
Proof of Theorem 2. Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Let W 1 -W 2 ∈ P R * .
• 
DYNAMICALLY EFFICIENT KIDNEY EXCHANGE
The kidney exchange problem is a special case of the general model that we considered above. In this problem, we refer to an object-agent pair as a recipient-donor pair. The type space for kidney needs is defined through blood-and tissue-type compatibility.
Before a donor is deemed compatible with a recipient, two tests are required: a blood-type compatibility test and a tissue-type compatibility test (or cross-match test). There are four blood types, O, A, B, and AB. An O blood type recipient can only receive a transplant from an O donor, an A blood type recipient can only receive a transplant from an O or an A donor, a B blood type recipient can only receive a transplant from an O or a B donor, and an AB blood type recipient can receive a transplant from all donors. A recipient and a donor are blood-type compatible if the donor can feasibly donate a kidney to the recipient based on their blood types.
21. Since there is discounting and the number of W 2 -W 1 type pairs can only be an integer, sometimes the threshold can be 0 instead of a positive number.
Blood-type Compatibility Relation
Figure 5 Blood-type compatibility relation (also see Figure 1 (b))
Observe that the blood-type compatibility relation forms a partial order with three levels of compatibility. The O blood type is located at the highest level at level 1, the A and B blood types are located at level 2, and the AB blood type is at level 3 (see Figure 5 ).
There is yet another type of incompatibility for kidney recipients. Sometimes a recipient cannot receive a kidney from a blood-type compatible donor due to tissue-type incompatibility. There are six proteins on human DNA that determine the tissue type of a person. Some tissue types can be rejected by a recipient's immunological system. A formal test is done by mixing the blood of the donor and the recipient for testing tissue-type incompatibility prior to the transplant. If antibodies form in the recipient's blood against the donor's tissue antigens, then there is positive cross-match between the recipient and the donor, meaning that the donor and the recipient are tissue-type incompatible. A donor is tissue-type compatible with a recipient if there is negative cross-match between them. A donor is compatible with a recipient if he is both blood-and tissue-type compatible with the recipient. A recipient can receive a kidney only from compatible donors.
Usually, when a donor is compatible with his paired recipient, such a pair does not participate in exchange since the donor directly donates his kidney to the recipient. Hence, a blood-type compatible pair becomes available for exchange if and only if the pair is tissuetype incompatible. For tissue-type incompatibility between the donors and patients of different pairs, we will make an additional assumption. This will give us an idea on limits of kidney exchange (see Roth, Sönmez andÜnver, 2007) :
Assumption 4 (Limit assumption). No recipient is tissue-type incompatible with the donor of another pair.
Recipients can be tissue-type incompatible with their own donors, and we assume that p c > 0 is the probability for that to happen. This ensures that blood-type compatible pairs arrive at the pool. On the other hand, recipients will never be tissue-type incompatible with donors of other pairs under Assumption 4; thus, two pairs will be mutually compatible if and only if they are mutually blood-type compatible. Note that average tissue-type incompatibility (positive cross-match) probability is reported as p c = 0.11 by Zenios, Woodle and Ross (2001) .
We will continue to maintain Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 for kidney exchanges as well. In Section 5.2.1, we show that these assumptions are plausible for kidney exchange. We also comment on what happens when these assumptions are relaxed in Section 5.2.1 and in Appendix B.
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The efficient kidney exchange mechanism
We are ready to present the pair type space for kidney exchanges. The blood types give the compatibility type of each recipient and donor (under Assumption 4). Therefore, the type of a pair is represented by the blood type of the recipient and the blood type of the donor in the pair. There are 16 pair types. We state the overdemanded, underdemanded, self-demanded, and reciprocally demanded types as follows: 
Computation of the efficient multi-way kidney exchange mechanism
In this subsection, we first formulate the underlying arrival process of incompatible pairs to the exchange pool. For any pair type X-Y ∈ P, let q X-Y be the probability of a random pair being of type X-Y. We refer to q X-Y as the arrival probability of pair type X-Y ∈ T. We have X-Y ∈T q X-Y = 1. A compatible pair does not become available for exchange. Recall that p c , the probability of tissue-type incompatibility, is the probability of a blood-type compatible pair being available for exchange, and 1 is the probability of a blood-type incompatible pair being available for exchange. We derive the exchange arrival probabilities of each type X-Y, p X-Y , as follows. For each self-demanded and overdemanded type X-Y∈
, and for each underdemanded and reciprocally demanded type X-Y∈ P U ∪ P R , we have
Plausibility of the assumptions for kidney exchange.
We comment on the efficient kidney exchange mechanism when Assumption 3 is relaxed in Appendix B, i.e. the case when self-demanded types participate in kidney exchange.
Next, we comment on the plausibility of our Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 for kidney exchange:
• Assumption 1 concerns the underlying arrival probabilities of the pairs and the applied matching mechanism. We first show that Assumption 1, i.e. having arbitrarily many underdemanded pairs in the exchange pool in the long run, is a realistic assumption: 
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Proof of Proposition 5. By Proposition 2, underdemanded type O-A can only be matched in a two-way exchange with its reciprocal type, in an exchange using an AB-O type pair, or in an exchange using a B-O type pair and an A-B type pair such as (B-O, O-A, A-B) (see also Roth, Sönmez andÜnver, 2007) . Since
even if all of these types, O-A, AB-O, or B-O and A-B, are used exclusively to match O-A type pairs, there will still be arbitrarily many O-A pairs left in the pool in the long run. Similarly, an underdemanded type B-AB pair can only be matched in a two-way exchange with its reciprocal type pair, an AB-O type pair, or in an exchange using an AB-A type pair and an A-B type pair such as (AB-A, A-B, B-AB) (see also Roth, Sönmez andÜnver, 2007) . Since
even if all of AB-O, AB-B, or AB-A together with A-B type pairs are used exclusively to match B-AB type pairs, arbitrarily many B-AB type pairs will remain in the exchange pool in the long run. Symmetric versions of these observations hold for O-B and AB-B. By Proposition 2, an O-AB pair can only be matched using an AB-O pair. Since
even if AB-O type pairs are used exclusively to match AB-O type pairs, arbitrarily many underdemanded type pairs will remain in the long run. Moreover, all these results are true regardless of the matching mechanism used.
The hypotheses of the above proposition are very mild, and will hold for sufficiently small tissue-type incompatibility (i.e. cross-match) probability p c . Moreover, they hold for real-life blood frequencies. For example, assuming that the recipient and her paired-donor are blood-unrelated, the arrival rates reported at the end of this subsection satisfy these assumptions, when the cross-match probability is p c = 0.11, as reported by Zenios, Woodle and Ross (2001) .
• Assumption 2 limits the arrival rates of A-B and B-A type pairs to be close to each other. However, it does not give a measure of closeness. There is no literature reporting these rates except Terasaki, Gjertson and Cecka (1998) who report that the arrival rates of A-B and B-A type pairs as q A−B = 0.05 and q B−A = 0.03 but do not explain from which sample these are obtained. Under independent sampling conditions, we would expect these rates to be equal to each other. • Assumption 4 is a limit assumption. However, it is also a somewhat realistic assumption for certain cases. If the recipient is female and has previously borne the child of her paired-donor, then her body is more likely to reject her paired-donor's kidney than other random kidneys due to tissue-type incompatibility (cf. Zenios, Woodle, and Ross, 2001 ).
If we eliminate these assumptions, the structure of the dynamic programming problem will change. Even then, we can create object types and their compatibility relation as a general partial order. Hence, we can classify the pair types as underdemanded, overdemanded, selfdemanded, and reciprocally demanded. Using results in dynamic programming, it can be shown that an efficient deterministic Markov mechanism exists.
Computational approximation for the efficient kidney exchange mechanism.
The threshold values of the efficient multi-way kidney exchange mechanism cannot be solved analytically. In this section, using different parameters for λ λ+ and using p c , {q X-Y } X-Y∈P values reported in the medical literature, we numerically compute the efficient matching mechanism's threshold values under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Then we use these threshold values to approximate the thresholds when Assumption 3 does not hold and self-demanded types can participate in exchange (see Remark 1 in Appendix B), for subsequent policy simulations.
The algorithm used to compute the efficient threshold values uses Theorem 2 and the value iteration formula in Theorem 4 in Appendix A (see Puterman, 1994, p . 259 for a one-sided threshold version of the algorithm). The algorithm makes a 6001 state approximation (3000 negative and 3000 positive states, and state 0) of the infinite countable state space. The crossmatch probability is reported as p c = 0.11 by Zenios, Woodle and Ross (2001) . We also use this number. The medical literature is not precise about the arrival probabilities of the pairs. We have chosen the following way to construct these probabilities. The blood type frequencies of people are widely reported for the US population as follows: For O blood type q O = 0.45, for A blood type q A = 0.40, for B blood type q B = 0.11, and for AB blood type q AB = 0.04. 22 We assume that the pairs are blood-type unrelated (such as spouses), and hence the donor and recipient blood types are independently distributed. That is, for any X-Y∈ P, we have q X-Y = q X q Y .
We also compute the mechanism when q A-B and q B-A are not equal to each other. Terasaki, Gjertson and Cecka (1998) report that A-B and B-A blood type pairs do not arrive at the same frequency. They report that q A-B = 0.05 and q B-A = 0.03. In our computation, additionally, we use two different probability pairs: (1) q A-B = 0.049 and q B-A = 0.039 and (2) q A-B = 0.054 and q B-A = 0.034.
Since we assume in our initial efficient mechanism derivation that self-demanded types are not included, we find the conditional probabilities using the above formula such that arriving pairs are not self-demanded.
Since we do not have a clear prediction of the values of ρ and λ, we use different values in the computation. In particular, we choose different values for λ λ+ρ and derive the efficient mechanism. The set of values we use for λ λ+ρ is given as 23 {0. 999995, 0.99999, 0.99995, 0.9999, 0.9995, 0, 999, 0.995, 0.99, 0.95} . First, note that in all cases s * ≤ 0 and s * = 0. We report the threshold value for the stock of B-A type pairs to conduct the smaller exchanges, |s * | in Table 1 . For the number of B-A type pairs in the pool larger than |s * |, the efficient mechanism requires the largest exchanges. We observe that, under the most plausible 23. For example, λ λ+ρ = 0.999995 can be generated by λ = 10,000 and ρ = 0.05, which corresponds to 10,000 pairs arriving per year and an annual discount rate of 5%. On the other hand, λ λ+ρ = 0.9999 can be generated by λ = 10,000 and ρ = 0.10. We can roughly assume that the discount rate is 5-10%. Expectations for λ nationwide is around 10,000, given that the annual number of conducted live kidney donations is in the 6000-7000 range in the last few years. The lower values for (requiring only 10 pairs arriving per year at 5% discounting for ρ) may require conducting the largest possible exchanges all the time. We also observe that the threshold value increases with increasing (q A-B − q B-A ) and increasing λ λ+ρ . For example, when λ λ+ρ = 0.999995 (with an average of 10,000 compatible and incompatible pairs arriving per year and an annual discount rate ρ = 5%), q B-A = 0.034 and q A-B = 0.054, the largest exchanges involving B-A type pairs will be conducted if and only if there are more than 2773 B-A type pairs in the pool.
Simulations on expected exchange surplus.
In this subsection, we relax Assumption 3 again, and assume that self-demanded types can participate in exchange. We compute the expected 1-year exchange surplus (normalized by the two-way exchange regime) at null state (having no A-B or B-A type pairs, and no self-demanded type pairs) for two different matching mechanisms. We use
• Regime 1: The single-state variable, one-threshold approximation of the dynamically efficient multi-way matching mechanism,φ s * ,s * (cf. Appendix B).
• Regime 2: Dynamically efficient two-way matching mechanism ν.
We used the following technique in our simulation. We roughly calibrated our parameters using the US data. We chose λ =10,000 (given that 6570 live donor transplants are conducted per year, and assumed that 10,000 pairs arrive per year) and ρ = 0.05 (that is, the discount rate is 5%) with λ λ+ρ = 0.999995. We set q B-A = 0.034 and q A-B = 0.054, as reported by Terasaki, Gjertson and Cecka (1998) . We assumed that there were arbitrarily many underdemanded pairs (Assumption 1) and that there was no tissue-type incompatibility between two different pairs (Assumption 4). We simulated the pool for the next arriving 10,000 pairs (approximately for 1 year) and calculated the normalized surplus raised taking the two-way exchange as numéraire. We ran this simulation 5000 times. The averages and standard errors of the averages for the 1-year normalized exchange surplus were taken over these 5000 markets (see Table 2 ). We observed that the efficient multi-way exchange raises about 6.6% more expected surplus than the efficient two-way exchange. This difference is significant at the 1% level using a z-test.
We report the number of pairs matched in 1 year under the two different regimes. We also report the number of pairs that could have been matched if all exchanges were run at the end of the year in a static population. Under the efficient multi-way mechanism, about 6.7% more pairs are matched than the efficient two-way mechanism. This difference is significant at the 1% level using a z-test. Even though the efficient exchange is conducted dynamically, the numbers of pairs matched is close to the maximal possible number (see Table 3 ). This is an expected result. By Proposition 1, we know that the efficient two-way matching mechanism matches the maximum number of pairs possible, and this table shows that. On the other hand, under the efficient multi-way mechanism, this observation may not be true, since some B-A (0.00056) or A-B type pairs may remain in the pool at the end of the year, and those could have been matched in a static exchange run at the end of the year.
24
We also report the number of exchanges of different sizes under Regime 1: Efficient multiway exchange in Table 4 (in approximately 1 year). These are the average numbers found in the above simulation. We observe that the majority of the exchanges are two-way exchanges, though we observe a substantial number of three-way and four-way exchanges. The numbers of larger exchanges are substantially less (less than 2% of all exchanges). We observe that 67% of all exchanges conducted are two-way, 25% are three-way, and only 7% are four-way exchanges. Therefore, the efficient multi-way mechanism does not create a large burden in terms of large exchanges.
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6. CONCLUSIONS Having a partial order compatibility structure (which is not a linear order) is the necessary requirement for multi-way dynamically efficient mechanisms having state-dependent features and being different from statically efficient mechanisms. We use a minimal partial order structure to derive dynamically efficient exchange mechanisms in a general exchange model. We observe three important properties of dynamically efficient mechanisms. They (for both two-way and multi-way matching) are not affected by the magnitude of the unit waiting cost c. They conduct at most one exchange at a time. Moreover, whenever an exchange becomes feasible, they conduct it immediately.
In a static setting, Roth, Sönmez andÜnver (2007) showed that n-way exchanges usually suffice to obtain all benefits from an exchange domain with n object types under a partial order compatibility relation and mild assumptions. In our study, for kidney exchanges, when self-demanded type pairs participate in exchange, the largest possible exchange size is 8 instead of 4 as predicted by the above result, since in a dynamic setting some of the assumptions of the above study do not hold. In the simulations conducted, we showed that exchanges larger than four-way are extremely rare in a dynamic setting.
The policy simulations show that the threshold values of the efficient kidney exchange mechanism are quite sensitive to the changes in arrival probabilities of A-B and B-A type pairs. Therefore, for our mechanism to have a realistic application, the health authority should measure these arrival rates, precisely, and these rates should be close to each other.
A final note about incentive properties of dynamically efficient mechanisms will be useful. We can refine the definition of efficient mechanisms as follows. If an X-Y type pair is going to be matched in an exchange and there are multiple X-Y type pairs available in the pool, then the mechanism selects the earliest arriving pair. Suppose that a pair of type X-Y∈ P can manipulate its type and announce it as W-Z∈ P with W X and Y Z. 25 It is easy to show that announcing X-Y is the weakly dominant strategy for the pair, i.e. the mechanisms are strategy-proof. 26 Entry timing can be another strategic tool. Suppose that each pair, after becoming available, can delay its entry to the pool as a strategic variable. In this case, the above dynamically efficient two-way and multi-way matching mechanisms are delay-proof, i.e. no pair will benefit by delaying its entry to the pool.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF RESULTS
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that pair i of type X-Y∈ P O is the only overdemanded pair in the pool, j = i is a type Z 1 -Z 2 ∈ P pair in the pool, and E = (j, j 1 , . . . , j k ) is an exchange that matches pair j . Let A -O be the type of each pair j in E. We have Z 2 A 1 , O A +1 for all ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and A k Z 1 . Two cases are possible:
• Type of j ∈ P U : Since Z 1 Z 2 and Z 2 = Z 1 , by acyclicity of , there exists one pair j with O A and O = A , i.e. there exists an overdemanded pair j ∈ E. Since i is the single overdemanded pair in the pool, j = i. By transitivity of and by the fact that there are at most two object types at a compatibility level of , we have (1a) Z 2 X or (1b) Z 2 X and X Z 2 , and yet there exists some j m ∈ E with m < such that j m is of type Z 2 -X (so that E is individually rational). Similarly, we have (2a) Y Z 1 or (2b) Z 1 Y 25. Observe that announcing Y Z or W X may result with individually irrational exchanges. Hence, we assume that such manipulations are not possible.
26. In the context of kidney exchange, since blood types exclusively determine the compatibility between a recipient and a donor of another pair, and since manipulating blood types is extremely difficult, it is almost impossible for a pair to use "compatibility" as a strategic tool to manipulate the dynamic system. and Y Z 1 , and yet there exists some j m ∈ E with m > such that j m is of type Y-Z 1 . 27 This proves necessity.
-If (1a) and (2a) are satisfied, we can always choose E (in terms of types of pairs) as (Z 1 -Z 2 , X-Y) .
-If (1b) and (2a) are satisfied, we can choose E as (Z 1 -Z 2 , Z 2 -X, X-Y) .
-If (1a) and (2b) are satisfied, we can choose E as (Z 1 -Z 2 , X-Y, Y-Z 1 ) .
-If (1b) and (2b) are satisfied, we can choose E as (Z 1 -Z 2 , Z 2 -X, X-Y, Y-Z 1 ) .
These prove sufficiency.
• Type of j ∈ P S : Since Z 2 = Z 1 , when there is another pair h of type Z 1 -Z 1 , a two-way exchange consisting of types (Z 1 -Z 1 , Z 1 -Z 1 ) is an individually rational exchange, and E could be chosen using these types. Suppose that there is no other pair of type Z 1 -Z 1 in the pool. Then by acyclicity of , there exists some pair j with O A with O = A , i.e. there exists an overdemanded pair j ∈ E. Since i is the single overdemanded pair in the pool, j = i. By transitivity of and by the fact that there are at most two object types at a compatibility level of , we have (1a) Z 1 X or (1b) Z 1 X and X Z 1 , and yet there exists some j m ∈ E with m < such that j m is of type Z 1 -X (so that E is individually rational). Similarly, we have (2a) Y Z 1 or (2b) Z 1 Y and Y Z 1 , and yet there exists some j m ∈ E with m > such that j m is of type Y-Z 1 . These prove necessity.
-If (1a) and (2a) These prove sufficiency.
• Type of j ∈ P R : We have Z 2 Z 1 and Z 1 Z 2 . Suppose there is a pair h of type Z 2 -Z 1 . Then a two-way exchange consisting of types (Z 1 -Z 2 , Z 2 -Z 1 ) is an individually rational exchange, and E could be chosen using these types. Suppose that there is no pair of type Z 2 -Z 1 in the pool. Then by acyclicity of , there exists some pair j with O A with O = A , i.e. there exists an overdemanded pair j ∈ E. Since i is the single overdemanded pair in the pool, j = i. By the fact that there are only two types in the compatibility levels of Z 1 and Z 2 , there are no possible reciprocal types other than Z 1 -Z 2 and Z 2 -Z 1 . Since Z 2 -Z 1 type pair does not exist, there is no other pair of the same compatibility level with in Z 1 -Z 2 in the exchange E,and by acyclicity we have Z 2 X and Y Z 1 i.e. Z-Y and Z 1 -Z 2 are mutually compatible types, proving necessity. The types of pairs in E can be chosen as (Z 1 -Z 2 , X-Y) whenever Z 2 X and Y Z 1 , proving sufficiency. Thus, the exchange E consisting of pairs belonging to pair types
Proposition 6 (Maximal exchange composition using overdemanded types
is a feasible (k + n + 1)-way exchange.
We can enlarge exchange E by inserting the given self-demanded type pairs in order to obtain exchange E as follows:
• Recall that for each d ∈ {1, . . . , − 1} with same level V d+1 and V d , there exists some index c d ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that
In the exchange E above, we can insert Thus, the newly formed exchange E serves all of the n + k + + 1 pairs including the ones given in the hypothesis of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let an overdemanded pair i of type X-Y ∈ P O arrive at the exchange pool. We will show that the opportunity cost of holding onto the X-Y type pair and underdemanded pairs, which could be matched immediately, with the expectation of creating a larger exchange in the future is larger than any alternative decision.
First note that pair i will not be used in matching an underdemanded pair that will arrive in the future. Since all underdemanded pairs exist abundantly by Assumption 1, by Corollary 1 we can use it to match L X − L Y underdemanded pairs in an exchange E immediately. Moreover suppose that we can match in total n pairs in this exchange (possibly including some reciprocally demanded and self-demanded pairs). In the future, L X − L Y is the most underdemanded pairs we can match through pair i, thus we do not hold onto i to match future underdemanded pairs.
We will show that pair i will not be used in matching a self-demanded type pair that will arrive in the future, either. Suppose that V-V is a self-demanded type and a pair of this type can be inserted in exchange E (see Proposition 6 and its proof). Hence, if pair i is used to wait for a V-V type pair to arrive, n pairs in exchange E will wait until the V-V type pair arrives, instead of being matched immediately. A V-V type pair can be matched in several ways. It can be matched with another V-V type pair in a two-way exchange. Or it can be inserted in other exchanges between two pairs such that the object of the first pair is compatible with V and the requirement of the agent of the second pair is also compatible with V. Consider the case in which we match it exclusively with a future V-V type pair j . For the same expected duration that pairs in exchange E wait for pair j to arrive, pair j will wait until the next V-V type pair arrives. Thus, the cost of this exchange is making a future V-V type pair j wait for the same expected duration for a new V-V type pair. This second alternative is less costly than making n (which is larger than 1) pairs of the exchange E wait for the same expected duration; therefore an X-Y type pair i will not be used to match an expected V-V type pair in the future.
Next, we show that pair i will not be used in matching a reciprocally demanded type pair that will arrive in the future. Suppose that instead of exchange E, we use the type X-Y pair to match one reciprocally demanded pair k of type W 1 -W 2 that will arrive in the future. Moreover, by Proposition 2, pairs in E (other than pair i) cannot be matched without i. Thus, suppose that we would like to use pair i to serve also this first pair k which will arrive in the future. This causes the exchange E not to be conducted immediately and forces n pairs to wait. By Corollary 1, we can match n + 1 pairs (including k) immediately when k arrives, if we do not conduct exchange E now.
We will find an upper-bound for exchange surplus regarding these n pairs and all W 1 -W 2 and W 2 -W 1 type pairs that will arrive in the future. Then, we will find a lower-bound for exchange surplus when n pairs are instantly matched within exchange E and the overdemanded type pair i is not held on to. Then, we will show that when p W 1 −W 2 and p W 2 −W 1 are sufficiently close to each other, the second surplus is greater than the the first one.
Observe Also observe that the upper-bound of total expected surplus assuming that all W 1 -W 2 type pairs are matched as soon as they arrive is given as: Similarly, the upper-bound of total expected surplus assuming that all W 2 -W 1 type pairs are matched as soon as they arrive is given as λ 2 ρ c ρ .
• First, we find an upper-bound of surplus (regarding pairs in E and all future W 1 -W 2 and W 2 -W 1 type pairs) from waiting and not conducting exchange E immediately:
where in the first line λ 1 +λ 2 λ 1 +λ 2 +ρ is the discounting that occurs until either a W 1 -W 2 or W 2 -W 1 pair arrives and -probability λ 1 λ 1 +λ 2 refers to the pair arriving being of type W 1 -W 2 and normalized (by ρ c ) surplus n + 1 refers to the fact that we conduct the (n + 1)-way exchange using the W 1 -W 2 type pair and the waiting n pairs, normalized surplus
ρ is an upper-bound of all future matches regarding W 1 -W 2 and W 2 -W 1 type pairs; -probability λ 2 λ 1 +λ 2 refers to the pair arriving being of type W 2 -W 1 and normalized surplus n refers to the fact that we conduct exchange E at that instance, and 1 + • When a self-demanded type pair arrives: Suppose this pair is of type X-X. If there is another type X-X pair available in the exchange pool, then we obtain a two-way exchange by matching these two pairs together immediately.
• When a non-self-demanded type pair arrives: Let E = (i 1 , . . . , i k ) be the efficient exchange according to the efficient mechanism φ s * ,s * without taking the existence of self-demanded types into consideration (let i k+1 ≡ i 1 ). If there exists a self-demanded X-X type pair i available in the exchange pool such that there are pairs i and i +1 with an X blood-type donor and an X blood-type recipient, respectively, then we can insert pair i between pairs i and i +1 and obtain a feasible exchange E . We repeat the process with E until no feasible self-demanded type pair remains to be inserted. We conduct the final exchange obtained.
Let this mechanism be calledφ s * ,s * . We conduct policy simulations using this mechanism.
